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ABSTRACT 
  In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., the United States 
Supreme Court held that the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act violated the First Amendment right to free speech because the 
statute restricted a form of political speech known as issue advocacy. 
In attempting to protect this right from government intrusion, 
however, the Court improperly excluded considerations of democracy 
from its free speech analysis. The opinion consequently 
misrepresented the nature of the right to free speech for two 
independent but related reasons. First, because preserving a well-
functioning democracy is the primary reason free speech is protected, 
the right to free speech does not exist when it is not justified by—nor 
when it conflicts with—the interest in preserving a healthy democracy. 
Second, an inductive review of American history and law shows that 
democracy is an independent right. The Court was therefore 
responsible for determining whether the political speech in question 
conflicted with the right to democracy and adjudicating between these 
two rights. By explicitly deciding not to weigh the impact that issue 
advocacy has on democracy, the Court set the dangerous precedent 
that courts can decide free speech cases without considering whether 
the speech in question tramples on the interests and rights that define 
it and determine its scope. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Americans have long understood that the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of free expression protects critical elements of American 
democracy.1 It promotes tolerance within a heterogeneous nation,2 
protects the diversity of beliefs among citizens,3 helps citizens 
separate truth from falsehood in politics,4 and enables the education 
of citizens so they are capable of governing themselves.5 Democracy 
and the freedom of expression are so intertwined that Professor 
Alexander Meiklejohn describes the right to free speech as “a 
deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall 
be decided by universal suffrage.”6 
In the area of campaign finance reform, however, it is not always 
so clear that the freedom of expression uniformly promotes—rather 
than degrades—democratic health. In several United States Supreme 
Court cases, proponents of campaign finance regulation have charged 
that unregulated speech encourages corruption and allows wealth to 
inappropriately influence policy decisions.7 Such possibilities have 
prompted courts to examine the relationship between free speech 
rights and democracy in an attempt to reevaluate how much political 
speech the First Amendment should protect. 
The Supreme Court took up this task in two conflicting decisions: 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission8 and Federal Election 
 
 1. THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 47 
(1963) (“It is a basic element in the democratic way of life, and as a vital process it shapes and 
determines the ends of democratic society.”). 
 2. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.1.2, at 
930 (3d ed. 2006) (outlining the reasons freedom of speech should be a fundamental right (citing 
LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN 
AMERICA 9–10 (1986))). 
 3. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 132 (1993).  
 4. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 
877, 878 (1963). 
 5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For 
a discussion of the philosophical and practical goals that underpin the right to free speech, see 
infra Part III.A. 
 6. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
27 (1948). 
 7. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2672–73 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., 
announcing the judgment of the Court) (responding to arguments that the unregulated use of 
issue advertisements encourages corruption, the perception of corruption among citizens, and 
the undue influence of wealth on politics). 
 8. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
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Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL), Inc.9 Although less 
than four years separated the cases, the Court took opposing 
approaches in analyzing the relationship between free speech and 
democracy. Whereas the Court in McConnell was sensitive to how 
unregulated political advertising affects democratic governance, the 
WRTL Court refused to consider these effects and opted instead to 
focus on the right to free speech in isolation. This Note argues that 
McConnell properly treated democracy as a value worthy of 
protection. But because WRTL failed to consider the harms that 
political advertising may inflict on democracy, the Court improperly 
overlooked this fundamental American value.  
The central issue over which the McConnell and WRTL cases 
disagreed was whether the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
of 200210 (BCRA) could constitutionally prohibit a kind of paid 
political advertising known as issue advocacy.11 Whereas express 
advocacy is speech that explicitly advocates for or against a candidate 
for public office, issue advocacy includes any speech that mentions a 
candidate for public office.12 In McConnell, the Court upheld the 
 
 9. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). 
 10. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2, 28 and 47 U.S.C.). 
 11. Compare McConnell, 540 U.S. at 223 (upholding the prohibition), with Wis. Right to 
Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2659 (striking down the prohibition). The extensive McConnell opinion 
evaluated the constitutionality of many separate provisions of the statute; this Note addresses 
only the provision relevant to the Court’s decision in WRTL. 
 12. E.g., Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2659. The BCRA regulates both express advocacy 
and issue advocacy because it applies to any political advertisement that (1) “names a federal 
candidate for elected office,” (2) “is targeted to the electorate,” and (3) does not expressly 
solicit a vote for or against a candidate. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2658–59 (citing 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441b(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)). The Supreme Court had held since its 1976 decision in 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), that Congress could regulate “express 
advocacy,” that is, political advertisements that encourage voters to vote for or against a 
candidate by using “magic words” such as “vote for,” “elect,” “support,” and “defeat,” id. at 44 
& n.52. Partly to ensure that their advertisements would remain outside this realm of limitable 
speech, political advertisers instead began using “issue advocacy,” broadcasting advertisements 
that supported or attacked a candidate or issue without using Buckley’s magic words. 
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 131. The McConnell Court noted that 
[i]n 1996 both parties began to use large amounts of soft money to pay for issue 
advertising designed to influence federal elections. . . . [T]he ads enabled unions, 
corporations, and wealthy contributors to circumvent protections that FECA was 
intended to provide. Moreover, though ostensibly independent of the candidates, the 
ads were often actually coordinated with, and controlled by, the campaigns. The ads 
thus provided a means for evading FECA’s candidate contribution limits. 
Id. (citations omitted). Congress responded with the BCRA, which prohibited corporations and 
unions from airing issue advocacy pieces within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days of a 
general election. Id. at 132, 333–34. 
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BCRA’s ban on issue advocacy.13 In a 5–4 decision, the Court 
reasoned that electioneering communications, including “issue 
advertisements,” were the functional equivalent of express campaign 
advocacy.14 The Court concluded that Congress could therefore 
constitutionally regulate issue advocacy for the sake of mitigating 
various harmful effects, including the corruption and perception of 
corruption that might result from attempts to buy access to candidates 
through political contributions.15 
Yet after a two-Justice change from the McConnell Court,16 the 
majority in WRTL struck down a typical application of the same 
BCRA provision. The majority effectively overruled McConnell,17 
claiming that “the interests held to justify” the BCRA “do not justify 
restricting issue advocacy” because such advocacy is expression the 
First Amendment protects.18 The WRTL opinion claimed that the 
interests underlying the BCRA did not justify curtailing political 
speech. But the Court’s evaluation of those interests was in reality a 
series of explanations why the Court did not need to consider them.19 
The McConnell Court’s decision emphasized the need to weigh the 
value of protecting free speech against the practical interest in 
 
 13. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 223. 
 14. Id. at 206. 
 15. Id. at 205. 
 16. Chief Justice John Roberts replaced Chief Justice William Rehnquist in 2005, and 
Justice Samuel Alito replaced Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in 2006. The Supreme Court of the 
United States, Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www. 
supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2008). 
 17. Chief Justice Roberts’s principal opinion purported not to overrule McConnell. Wis. 
Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2674 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the Court). Despite 
his efforts, however, seven of the nine Justices expressed their belief that WRTL was in fact a 
decision to overturn McConnell. Id. at 2683 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (“[T]he principal opinion’s attempt at distinguishing McConnell is unpersuasive 
enough, and the change in the law it works is substantial enough, that seven Justices of this 
Court, having widely divergent views concerning the constitutionality of the restrictions at issue, 
agree that the opinion effectively overrules McConnell without saying so.”); see also id. at 2687 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (declaring the McConnell decision to be “effectively, and unjustifiably, 
overruled”). After all, although WRTL was only an as-applied challenge, the Court struck down 
a mainstream application of the law. Id. at 2659 (majority opinion). If an ordinary application 
could not survive a constitutional challenge, little reason exists to think that many other 
applications could. 
 18. Id. Justices disagree whether paying for political advertising should be considered 
political speech in the first place. Justice Stevens, for example, has claimed that “[m]oney is 
property; it is not speech.” Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, 
J., concurring). This Note assumes for its purposes that political advertising expenditures 
constitute political speech, or at least its functional equivalent. 
 19. See infra notes 38–50 and accompanying text. 
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protecting democracy from “the corrosive and distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth.”20 Yet the majority in WRTL was 
less willing to restrict political speech and perceived no conflict 
between free speech and democratic health.21 In fact, Justice 
Roberts’s and Justice Scalia’s opinions, which together formed the 
Court majority, ruled out democracy as a consideration by 
proclaiming that the Court’s sole responsibility is to protect speech—
not democracy.22 The WRTL Court thereby rendered inapposite the 
same factors on which the McConnell Court lingered just forty-two 
months earlier.23 
This Note contends that WRTL improperly excluded 
considerations of democracy from its free speech analysis, setting a 
one-sided and dangerous precedent for future free speech cases.24 The 
Court erred by excluding democracy from its free speech analysis for 
two reasons, both having to do with the nature of rights themselves. 
First, democracy is the primary reason the First Amendment protects 
free speech. Rights such as the right to free speech are extrinsically 
valuable; they exist for the sake of some other interest or interests. 
Any number of values—autonomy, good governance, and so on—can 
underlie a right. But whatever the underlying interest, a right extends 
only so far as the interest for which it exists. One of the primary 
interests that justify political speech rights is citizens’ collective 
interest in a well-functioning democratic government. Democracy is 
thus one of free speech’s reasons for being. By ignoring democracy, 
 
 20. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)); see also infra notes 25–32 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 46–52; see also, e.g., Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 
2686 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that if “the two 
values . . . coexist . . . . [i]t is perhaps our most constitutional task to assure freedom of political 
speech”). 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See infra Part I. 
 24. This Note does not evaluate the accuracy of claims that unregulated money in politics 
harms democracy; many other writers and organizations have already done so. See, e.g., 
BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 12 (2003) 
(arguing that the existing election regulation system is effective, that it is not particularly 
expensive in the context of consumers’ other expenditures, and that there is little evidence that 
it actually produces significant corruption); Miles Rapoport & Jason Tarricone, Election 
Reform’s Next Phase: A Broad Democracy Agenda and the Need for a Movement, 9 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 379, 401 (2002) (arguing, among other things, that the U.S. Congress 
should implement more restrictive campaign finance measures to “level[] the playing field for 
people of color and quality candidates who will represent the interests of average citizens and 
the poor instead of the interests of a few wealthy donors”). 
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the WRTL majority protected the particular application of a right 
without using the proper tools to determine the true extent of that 
right. 
Second, the WRTL Court’s logic was flawed because democracy 
is an independent right and the Court should have considered it as 
such. When one right abuts another, courts determining the extent of 
one right must consider the other right. A review of the Constitution, 
American tradition, and American law supports the notion that 
citizens have an entitlement to republican government. By failing to 
balance the right to democracy with—or against—the right to free 
speech, the WRTL Court sent the message that courts may discard 
efforts by the elected branches to improve participatory government 
without concern for the Republic. 
Part I of this Note explains how the WRTL majority treated 
democracy merely as a backdrop, a value that lacks meaningful 
implications for judicial decisionmaking. After reviewing some basic 
principles of rights theory in Part II, this Note shows in Part III that 
the Court’s unwillingness to consider democracy when evaluating 
political speech restrictions belied the reasons citizens have a right to 
free speech. Part IV explains that democracy is a right of the 
American people and shows how the WRTL Court allowed campaign 
finance practices to infringe that right. This Note concludes that the 
WRTL Court’s treatment—or nontreatment—of democracy is at odds 
with any coherent notion of free speech or American democracy. 
I.  THE SUPREME COURT’S DOUBLE VISION 
The members of the Court are sharply divided on whether to 
consider the value of democracy when evaluating political speech 
regulations. Whereas the McConnell majority affirmed the BCRA’s 
restrictions by emphasizing how democratic values influence the 
decision to allow government restrictions on political speech, the 
WRTL majority cast out democracy as a value unworthy of their 
consideration. 
A. Considering Democracy When Defining Free Speech: McConnell 
and the WRTL Dissent 
In McConnell, the Court upheld BCRA provisions imposing 
blackout periods before primary and general elections on paid 
broadcast advertisements by corporations and unions that mentioned 
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a candidate’s name.25 The majority reasoned that political speech 
without such regulation would damage the integrity of elected 
officials and the public’s perception of government.26 It explained that 
the Court’s case law has “repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at 
‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of 
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and 
that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas.’”27 Beyond these implications for the 
political process, the Court explained that regulating all 
electioneering communications helps prevent the circumvention of 
the other “[valid] contribution limits” that restrain the influence of 
money in politics.28 It also explained that when candidates receive 
large sums of corporate money, corruption and the perception of 
corruption that may result can harm the political process. “Just as 
troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo 
corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide”—or be 
perceived as deciding—“issues not on the merits or the desires of 
their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have 
made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.”29 
Lastly, the Court recognized, as did the later dissent in WRTL,30 that 
a system that fails to govern the use of money in politics undermines 
the connection between ideological agreement and political support.31 
The majority remarked that corporations and other entities often feel 
compelled to give “substantial sums to both major national parties, 
leaving room for no other conclusion but that these donors were 
 
 25. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 189–94. 
 26. See infra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
 27. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
652, 660 (1990)). 
 28. Id. (alteration in original) (citing FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003)). 
 29. Id. at 153. “Even if it occurs only occasionally, the potential for such undue influence is 
manifest.” Id. These quotations appeared in the Court’s discussion of a BCRA provision that 
prohibited national parties from receiving certain forms of financial contributions, but its 
analysis applied to this provision as well. The Court went on to remark that its 
treatment of contribution restrictions reflects more than the limited burdens they 
impose on First Amendment freedoms. It also reflects the importance of the interests 
that underlie contribution limits—interests in preventing “both the actual corruption 
threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confidence in 
the electoral process through the appearance of corruption.” 
Id. at 136 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982)). 
 30. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2688 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 31. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 148. 
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seeking influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting any 
particular ideology.”32 
Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in WRTL echoed 
McConnell’s list of concerns33 and expressed worry that unregulated 
elections threatened “democratic integrity.”34 Justice Souter feared 
that, if unregulated money corrupted politics, the electorate could 
become cynical.35 “[E]normous demands” for funds in an unregulated 
setting, Justice Souter wrote, ultimately “assign power to deep 
pockets.”36 Because “[v]oters know this,” an additional, “important 
consequence of the demand for big money to finance publicity [is] 
pervasive public cynicism.”37 
B. The WRTL Opinion 
In contrast to McConnell, Chief Justice Roberts’s principal 
opinion38 in WRTL dismissed democracy’s relevance. He took up only 
two of the dissenters’ concerns. First, regarding arguments that 
unregulated issue advocacy risks creating at least the appearance of 
corruption, Chief Justice Roberts stated that the Court’s prior 
decisions only held that corruption was an interest to be considered in 
financial contribution cases and were silent on whether the corruption 
interest is a factor in issue advocacy cases.39 In saying so, he did 
scarcely more than assert: “Enough is enough. Issue ads like WRTL’s 
are by no means equivalent to contributions, and the quid-pro-quo 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2689 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 34. Id. at 2687. 
 35. Id. For other decisions expressing concern about the harmful effects of corruption, see 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 148 (2003); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 
533 U.S. 431, 446 (2001); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388 (2000); Colo. 
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 648 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 36. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2688 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 37. Id. (citing statistics and analysis for this position). 
 38. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to the Court’s 
holding that it had jurisdiction to decide the case. Id. at 2663 (majority opinion). Joined only by 
Justice Alito, he wrote separately to argue that the BCRA was unconstitutional as applied. Id. 
at 2663–74 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the Court). Justice Scalia, joined by 
Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment, concluding that the statutory 
provision in question was unconstitutional and that McConnell should be overruled. Id. at 2684 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Because Chief Justice Roberts’s 
opinion was the narrower of the two opinions, it controls. 
 39. Id. at 2672 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the Court). 
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corruption interest cannot justify regulating them.”40 Because no 
precedent requires courts to consider the interest in avoiding 
corruption in political expenditure cases, he claimed, the interest in 
avoiding corruption does not apply.41 Without more, this line of 
argument is problematic because it takes the absence of a command 
to do something as a command not to do something; that no decision 
had yet required the Court to consider the effects of corruption in 
issue advocacy cases does not mean that the Court is not at liberty to 
take up the issue if it so chooses. Therefore, Chief Justice Roberts’s 
first argument concludes that the “corruption interest cannot justify 
regulating”42 issue advocacy because the Court’s hands are tied, yet it 
was clearly not encumbered in this way. 
Second, Chief Justice Roberts similarly addressed the “corrosive 
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth” that prior 
Court opinions had argued do not indicate “the public’s support for 
the corporation’s political ideas.”43 Roberts again relied on precedent 
to argue that this consideration had no pedigree outside of campaign 
speech cases.44 For instance, he explained that the McConnell Court 
was “willing to ‘assume that the interests that justify the regulation of 
campaign speech might not apply to the regulation of genuine issue 
ads.’”45 Therefore, the argument goes, the fact that prior discussions 
do not mandate that the corrosive effects of wealth be considered in 
genuine issue advocacy cases may be taken as evidence that the 
effects of money on politics should not be considered in issue 
advocacy situations. This, again, is problematic because it conflates 
license not to consider something with a reason—or even a 
mandate—not to consider it. 
Instead of addressing two of the democracy-related concerns 
articulated by prior courts, Chief Justice Roberts found reasons to 
 
 40. Id. In 1976, Buckley v. Valeo ruled that campaign contributions could be regulated for 
corruption-avoidance purposes. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19–21 (1976) (per curiam). 
 41. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2672 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the 
Court). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)). 
 44. Id. at 2672–73. 
 45. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 n.88 (2003)). Justice 
Roberts also argued that including issue advocacy under a ban on campaign speech “would call 
into question our holding in Bellotti that the corporate identity of a speaker does not strip 
corporations of all free speech rights.” Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 
(1978)). He made no claim that doing so would actually overturn or otherwise be inconsistent 
with Bellotti, however. 
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ignore them. His opinion made no descriptive claim as to whether 
wealth and corruption are corrosive to democracy in this setting. 
Chief Justice Roberts failed to address Justice Souter’s fears about 
threats to democratic governance. As a poor substitute, he used the 
same logic to dismiss both of the dissent’s concerns: because previous 
Court decisions failed to definitively answer a question, he reasoned, 
the Court should not consider the question. 
At least Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion outwardly recognized 
that it was unconcerned with democratic considerations. His central 
argument was that the BCRA’s restrictions on broadcast media were 
impermissibly vague, proscribing a much greater swath of expression 
than the legislation intended.46 Justice Scalia acknowledged the 
concerns raised in McConnell regarding the potentially corrosive 
effects of wealth in politics, the potential for corruption, and the 
likelihood that corporations and unions could “devis[e] expenditures 
that skirted the restriction on express advocacy.”47 But after 
recognizing these problems, he stated that speech was the Court’s 
only consideration.48 Freedom of speech and “our desire for healthy 
campaigns in a healthy democracy”49 may be incompatible in this 
case, he argued, but even if the “two values can coexist, it is pretty 
clear which side of the equation this institution is primarily 
responsible for.”50 
*          *          * 
In the McConnell and WRTL opinions, the Justices disagreed 
not simply about how democracy is best maintained; they disagreed 
on democracy’s relevance. Whereas some Justices claimed threats to 
democratic integrity were immaterial, others considered it of prime 
importance. They consequently talked past each other without 
conveying a comprehensive sense of how all the factors in a political 
speech analysis should be weighed against one another. More simply, 
Justices such as Scalia who have found it “pretty clear” that the Court 
 
 46. Id. at 2680 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This Note 
does not consider the accuracy of Justice Scalia’s contention. 
 47. Id. at 2682 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 48. Id. at 2686 (“Perhaps overruling this one part . . . of BCRA would not ‘ai[d] the 
legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption.’ But the First Amendment was not 
designed to facilitate legislation, even wise legislation.” (second alteration in original) (citations 
omitted) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194)). 
 49. Id. (quoting Rep. Richard Gephardt). 
 50. Id. 
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should not protect democracy have failed to consider the practical 
implications of their speech jurisprudence.51 This speech-at-all-costs 
view both erodes American citizens’ right to democracy and, as Part 
II demonstrates, belies the nature of rights.52 
II.  THE NATURE OF RIGHTS 
Before explaining how the Court’s decision in WRTL is 
incongruent with democracy and the logic of rights, it is important to 
establish some basic principles that govern rights. 
First, no right exists for its own sake. Rather, “rights exist to 
serve relevant interests of the right-holder” and are therefore only 
valuable because they promote those interests.53 By definition, to 
have a right is to have a legally or morally cognizable claim to or from 
something.54 Some rights are shorthand for entitlements that people 
have to some human good (for example, life, water, safety, and 
equality);55 others protect—or protect from—human action (for 
 
 51. See, e.g., id. at 2705 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he understanding of the voters and the 
Congress that this kind of corporate and union spending seriously jeopardizes the integrity of 
democratic government will remain. The facts are too powerful to be ignored . . . . It is only the 
legal landscape that now is altered, and it may be that today’s departure from precedent will 
drive further reexamination of the constitutional analysis . . . .”). 
 52. See infra Part III.B. 
 53. WILLIAM A. EDMUNDSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO RIGHTS 121 (2004). This Note 
builds upon the “instrumental approach” to rights, which asserts that rights are valuable 
because—and insofar as—they yield other established social goods. See STANLEY FISH, 
THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH: AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO 102 (1994) (“‘Free 
speech’ is just the name we give to verbal behavior that serves the substantive agendas we wish 
to advance.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 62–64 (2001) 
(“[A]lthough not commanded by the First Amendment, the instrumental approach has a 
respectable constitutional pedigree.” (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919))). Not 
all writers have shared this view; some have argued that that free speech is inherent in the moral 
nature of people as autonomous agents. Id. at 62–63 & nn.1–2 (noting that this position is 
sometimes taken). A number of commentators have discussed the nature of rights as 
instrumental (versus intrinsic). See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198 
(1977) (explaining that enforcing rights must have some point or purpose as its object); JEFF 
MCMAHAN, THE ETHICS OF KILLING: PROBLEMS AT THE MARGINS OF LIFE 330 (2002) 
(“[R]ights presuppose interests . . . .”); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 74 (1990) (explaining that 
“[r]ights are . . . justified for instrumental reasons” in a utilitarian framework). 
 54. See EDMUNDSON, supra note 53, at 42–43 (summarizing the Burkean argument that 
“the specification of any plausible kind of right presupposes the existence of a background of 
social convention”). 
 55. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71 art. 3, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (affirming the universal “right 
to life, liberty and security of person”). 
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example, rights to assembly, free exercise of religion, working in a 
discrimination-free environment).56 Either way, a right is always 
tethered to some purpose that it serves.57 This is particularly apparent 
when rights shield citizens from governmental interference or 
obligate the government to enforce other rights. As Professor Ronald 
Dworkin has explained, instituting rights “is a complex and 
troublesome practice that makes the Government’s job of securing 
the general benefit more difficult and more expensive, and it would 
be a frivolous and wrongful practice unless it served some point.”58 
Therefore, “[a]nyone who professes to take rights seriously, and who 
praises our Government for respecting them, must have some sense 
of what that point is.”59 
It follows that a right exists only insofar as legitimate interests 
underlie it: its license is its limitation. Failing to acknowledge this 
limit can quickly cause a right to appear capable of trampling other 
values and rights in ways generally thought undesirable. An unlimited 
right to free speech would permit libel;60 an unlimited right to the free 
exercise of religion could disrupt schools and other government 
functions.61 This problem is why an absolutist conception of rights is 
widely considered untenable.62 Treating rights as absolutes “is an 
 
 56. See, e.g., id. at 71 art. 19 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”). 
 57. For example, a person’s right to property exists, among other reasons, for the right 
holder’s “enjoyment and disposal . . . of all his acquisitions.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *73. 
 58. DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 198, 198–200. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 341 (1974) (“The legitimate state 
interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on 
them by defamatory falsehood. We would not lightly require the State to abandon this 
purpose . . . .”). 
 61. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867–70 (1982) (plurality opinion) (holding 
that a school board could not remove books from the school library “in a narrowly partisan or 
political manner” because doing so infringes students’ “right to receive ideas”); Mozert v. Bd. of 
Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he requirement that public school students study 
a basal reader series chosen by the school authorities does not create an unconstitutional burden 
under the Free Exercise Clause when the students are not required to affirm or deny a belief or 
engage or refrain from engaging in a practice prohibited or required by their religion.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 256 U.S. 350, 358 
(1921) (“[T]he word ‘right’ is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy to slip from a 
qualified meaning in the premise to an unqualified one in the conclusion.”); EDMUNDSON, 
supra note 53, at 147 (“At some point, what has been called the ‘no threshold’ view [of rights] 
begins to seem implausible.”); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT 
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illusion” that “tend[s] to downgrade rights into the mere expression 
of unbounded desires and wants.”63 The First Amendment does not 
protect people who shout “fire!” in a crowded theater because that 
action strays beyond what the justification for free speech rights 
allows.64 Therefore, a court’s first job when determining whether a 
right has been violated is to decide whether the asserted right protects 
the action at issue. As part of this inquiry, one ground “that can 
consistently be used to limit the definition of a particular right. . . . [is 
to] show that the values protected by the original right are not really 
at stake in the marginal case or are at stake only in some attenuated 
form.”65 When a right’s underlying values are not involved, that right 
does not exist. 
Second, rights act as “trumps.” The point of declaring something 
a right is to establish that it “trumps . . . other competing moral 
considerations,” even when the government is tempted to hamper the 
right for the sake of some social value.66 But just because a right 
indicates an underlying “trump suit”67 of moral or legal interests does 
 
OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 44–46 (1991) (presenting several reasons interpreting rights as 
absolutes is unworkable). 
 63. GLENDON, supra note 62, at 45. 
 64. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent protection of 
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”). 
 65. DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 198–204 (arguing that rights cannot be violated merely 
“for supposed reasons of the general good”). Professor Dworkin continues by reasoning that the 
government should only abridge a right “in clear-cut cases . . . when some compelling reason is 
presented, some reason that is consistent with the suppositions on which the original right must 
be based. It cannot be an argument for curtailing a right, once granted, simply that society 
would pay a further price for extending it.” Id. at 200. Facing a challenge to a state’s election 
laws, Justice Stevens summarized quite nicely how a court would weigh rights and underlying 
interests: 
[A] court must resolve such a challenge by an analytical process that parallels its work 
in ordinary litigation. It must first consider the character and magnitude of the 
asserted injury to the rights protected by the [Constitution] that the plaintiff seeks to 
vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the 
State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the 
Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, 
it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden 
the plaintiff’s rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a 
position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional. 
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
 66. EDMUNDSON, supra note 53, at 145. This explanation of the function of rights reflects a 
rather strong view of rights. Although rights are sometimes considered weaker and more easily 
violable than this Part describes, the view of rights this Note takes only makes the Note’s 
argument more difficult because it establishes a high bar for infringing traditionally protected 
free speech. 
 67. Id. 
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not mean it cannot be overridden by another trump.68 “[T]aking any 
[constitutional right] as far as it can go soon brings it into conflict with 
others,” at which point one right must override the other.69 To trump 
a right—that is, to infringe on it—one may prove another right 
conflicts with it. The conflict of one right with another right prompts a 
court, a legislature, or some other decisionmaker to consider the 
various factors and interests and arrive at a decision to limit one right 
or the other.70 
Two ways therefore exist to limit a right—either by showing that 
a right cannot logically exist beyond when underlying, legitimate 
interests justify its existence or by showing why it must yield to 
another right.71 These two mechanisms are central to explaining the 
flaw in the WRTL Court’s analysis. The next two Parts apply these 
mechanisms to demonstrate how the notion of democracy provides 
two independent reasons for limiting the First Amendment right to 
free speech. First, Part III develops the idea that, because the 
maintenance of democracy and good governance is the primary 
reason for First Amendment political speech protections, it also 
marks the outer boundary of political speech rights. Second, Part IV 
shows that in campaign finance reform cases, the independent right to 
democratic governance conflicts with political speech rights. For both 
reasons, the logic of the WRTL Court is problematic because it 
arbitrarily vitiated essential considerations from its calculus, setting a 
dangerous precedent. 
III.  DEMOCRACY AS THE RATIONALE FOR FREE SPEECH 
As Part II has explained, a right can exist only when its 
underlying interests are at stake. Campaign finance cases such as 
McConnell and WRTL provide opportunities for the Supreme Court 
to trace the contours of the right to free speech, identifying the right’s 
legal and historical rationales to evaluate more precisely the bounds 
of that right. As Section A explains, a robust set of philosophical and 
practical goals underpin the right to free speech. Section B shows how 
 
 68. Id. at 146. 
 69. GLENDON, supra note 62, at 44; see also supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text. 
 70. DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 198–200. 
 71. Cf. DVD: American Foreign Policy in the War on Terror: Is Torture Ever Acceptable? 
(Columbia Law School 2005) (on file with author) (explaining that one can qualify or limit a 
right either “by . . . [allowing] it to be subordinated to” other rights or values or by “redefin[ing] 
the central idea” to exclude certain circumstances). 
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the WRTL Court ignored these purposes, undermining its analysis 
and its holding. 
A. Why the First Amendment Right to Free Speech Exists 
Commentators often lament the Supreme Court’s muddled 
jurisprudence regarding the use of money in politics.72 Although the 
First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,”73 its simple language gives 
little indication as to what that freedom of speech entails. “Even the 
rhetorically principled Justice Scalia, with his almost religious 
adherence to textualism . . . has acknowledged that ‘[the First 
Amendment] does not list the full range of [protected] 
communicative expression.’”74 There is, as a result, plenty of room for 
disagreement over the meaning of the First Amendment, including 
whether it was intended to protect financial expenditures made to 
communicate a political message.75 
The task of determining the meaning of the pithy amendment 
ultimately falls upon the United States Supreme Court. “Because 
campaign finance reform legislation, in its attempt to effectively 
combat circumvention, invariably touches upon so many types of 
conduct the Court has been forced to apply First Amendment 
principles to a complex array of regulatory provisions.”76 Typically 
mired in fact-specific determinations and opinions by justices who can 
scarcely agree, the Court’s jurisprudence consequently tends not to 
provide broad or straightforward answers to constitutional questions 
 
 72. See, e.g., Wayne Batchis, Reconciling Campaign Finance Reform with the First 
Amendment: Looking Both Inside and Outside America’s Borders, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27, 
48–49 (2006) (“The confusing morass of perspectives on the constitutionality of campaign 
finance reform revealed by the Court’s decisions to date, and solidified by its most recent 
opinions in McConnell and Randall, has cast the future of reform into a cloud of uncertainty.”); 
see also, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 591 (1982) 
(“There seems to be general agreement that the Supreme Court has failed in its attempts to 
devise a coherent theory of free expression.”). 
 73. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 74. Batchis, supra note 72, at 42 (alterations in original) (quoting Antonin Scalia, 
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in 
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 3, 37–38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 43. “[T]he Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with regard to [campaign finance 
reform] issues makes matters worse.” Id. 
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on the subject.77 As the disagreement between the McConnell and 
WRTL opinions demonstrates, the Justices disagree not only on the 
conclusion (whether to allow restrictions on certain forms of speech) 
but also on how to arrive at a conclusion. 
Since the Founding, “several different views as to why freedom 
of speech should be regarded as a fundamental right” have emerged.78 
None of these rationales is exclusive, and writers often assume that 
they all coexist.79 Among the rationales for free speech are the 
advancement of individual autonomy,80 the discovery of truth,81 and 
the promotion of tolerance.82 But one of the strongest explanations is 
that the right to free speech derives from the nature of democracy 
itself.83 There is a great deal of evidence that the Founders were 
concerned about “whether societies of men are really capable or not 
of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or 
whether they are forever destined to depend for their political 
constitutions on accident and force.”84 On one hand, the Founders 
valued free speech because it “[l]et[s] [Truth] and Falsehood 
 
 77. Id.; see also Redish, supra note 72, at 591 (“There seems to be general agreement that 
the Supreme Court has failed in its attempts to devise a coherent theory of free expression. 
These efforts have been characterized by ‘a pattern of aborted doctrines, shifting rationales, and 
frequent changes of position by individual Justices.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Vincent Blasi, 
The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 526)). 
 78. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 11.1.2, at 925–30 (outlining the four major speech 
rationales this Section summarizes); see also Emerson, supra note 4, at 878–79 (identifying four 
categories of “values sought by society in protecting the right to freedom of expression”). 
 79. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 11.1.2, at 925. 
 80. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA 
L. REV. 964, 966 (1978) (arguing for a “liberty theory [that] justifies protection because of the 
way the protected conduct fosters individual self-realization and self-determination”); Redish, 
supra note 72, at 593 (“[T]he constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only one 
true value, which I have labeled ‘individual self-realization.’”). 
 81. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market . . . .”); Emerson, supra note 4, at 878 (“The values sought by society in protecting 
the right to freedom of expression . . . [include] a means of attaining the truth . . . .”). 
 82. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 11.1.2, at 930 (outlining the reasons freedom of 
speech should be a fundamental right (citing LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 9–10 (1986))). 
 83. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) (“Constitutional protection should be accorded only to speech that is 
explicitly political. There is no basis for judicial intervention to protect any other form of 
expression . . . .”); see also, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 6, at 27 (noting that the right to free 
speech is “a deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by 
universal suffrage”). 
 84. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 33. 
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grapple”; it provides the ground rules through which robust debate 
and dialogue can most easily promote human happiness.85 On the 
other hand, the right to free speech prevents “suppression by the 
government of political ideas of which it disapprove[s], or which it 
f[inds] threatening.”86 For these reasons, “[w]hatever differences may 
exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is 
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental 
affairs.”87 
Supreme Court jurisprudence has long reflected this view, often 
taking the position that “the ability to criticize government and 
government officers [is] ‘the central meaning of the First 
Amendment.’”88 As Justice Louis Brandeis put it, “[t]hose who won 
our independence believed that . . . . [the] freedom . . . to speak as you 
think” is “indispensable to the discovery and spread of political 
truth,” protects “against the dissemination of noxious doctrine,” 
guarantees the substance of the freedom of assembly, and promotes 
“stable government.”89 The freedom of expression is therefore a 
“fundamental principle of the American government.”90 The 
democracy rationale seems especially appropriate for political speech, 
for which the First Amendment has its “fullest and most urgent 
 
 85. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA; A SPEECH OF MR. JOHN MILTON FOR THE LIBERTY 
OF UNLICENC’D PRINTING TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND 35 (London, Percy Lund, 
Humphries & Co. Ltd. 1927) (1644); see also Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an 
Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255, 255–57 (“Self-government can exist only insofar as the 
voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general 
welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express.”). 
 86. SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 132. “There can be little doubt that suppression by the 
government of political ideas of which it disapproved, or which it found threatening, was the 
central motivation for the [First Amendment free speech] clause.” Id. 
 87. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 132 
(“The best view of the relevant history is that political speech was thought to form the core of 
the free speech principle.”). 
 88. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 11.1.2, at 927 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 273 (1964)). “There is little disagreement that political speech is at the core of that 
protected by the First Amendment.” Id.; see also, e.g., Mills, 384 U.S. at 218 (explaining that the 
“free discussion of governmental affairs” is one of the primary rationales for First Amendment 
protections); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[M]en . . . may come to believe . . . that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free 
trade in ideas . . . and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried 
out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”). 
 89. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 90. Id. at 375; see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“[S]peech 
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”). 
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application” and for which the content of the speech is most clearly 
aimed at affecting the political process.91 
Thus, maintaining a healthy democracy is one of the key interests 
justifying First Amendment free speech protections. Its long tradition 
in American history, legal theory, and jurisprudence establishes its 
central role in questions of political expression. 
B. The First Role Democracy Should Have Played in WRTL 
The central issue before the Court in WRTL was whether the 
BCRA’s regulations unjustifiably infringed on free speech rights.92 
Because rights exist only when interests justify them,93 it makes little 
sense to evaluate the constitutionality of infringements on rights 
without first determining the boundaries of the rights. Answering this 
question would have required the Justices to establish whether free 
speech rights existed to the extent that they conflicted with BCRA 
restrictions. Determining the extent of free speech rights in turn 
would have required them to examine the interests free speech rights 
are supposed to protect: individual autonomy, the discovery of truth, 
promotion of tolerance, and, most applicably, the maintenance of a 
healthy democratic republic.94 
The WRTL majority, however, did not consider the effect that 
BCRA had on democracy and other interests giving rise to free 
speech rights.95 The Court therefore endeavored to protect a right 
without inquiring whether the right exists. Because the Court refused 
to determine whether political speech rights extended to protect 
WRTL’s advertisements, it did not distinguish the right to political 
 
 91. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971); see also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 
U.S. 45, 53–54 (1982) (requiring a state to have a compelling interest before it restricts political 
speech). To this end, the Supreme Court has held that political speech is entitled to protection 
under the strict scrutiny standard. E.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 
(2007) (“Because BCRA § 203 burdens political speech, it is subject to strict scrutiny.”); Austin 
v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990); Brown, 456 U.S. at 53–54 (holding 
that a statute nullifying a candidate’s electoral victory based on a false campaign promise that 
the candidate promptly retracted was unconstitutional as applied because it was “inconsistent 
with the atmosphere of robust political debate protected by the First Amendment”); First Nat’l 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (“Especially where . . . speech is intimately 
related to the process of governing . . . ‘the burden is on the government to show the existence 
of [a compelling] interest.’” (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976))). 
 92. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2664. 
 93. See supra Part II. 
 94. See supra notes 78–87 and accompanying text. 
 95. See supra notes 38–49 and accompanying text. 
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speech from the mere act of political speech. The Supreme Court 
therefore gave the dint of precedent to the idea that courts can 
protect speech by presuming that the speaker had a right to it without 
ever investigating to see whether in fact that right extended to the 
speaker. 
Tracing free speech back to its purposes adds another step to 
courts’ free speech analysis, but requiring justification for First 
Amendment rights does not necessarily make it more difficult to 
protect them. Indeed, it is not a foregone conclusion that the WRTL 
majority would have upheld the BCRA’s restrictions on speech had 
the Court considered the extent of free speech protections based on 
the purpose of the right. Instead of ignoring the underpinnings of free 
speech, the Court could have said that free speech creates an open 
marketplace of ideas, which best promotes democracy by allowing 
citizens to discover the truth for themselves.96 It could have argued 
that campaign finance regulations make it harder for challengers to 
defeat incumbents;97 that political speech is most important during the 
days before an election; or that the BCRA unduly encumbered other 
interests underlying speech rights, such as self-realization and self-
expression.98 The Court raised none of these points. By abstaining, it 
not only blinded itself to any harm it may have been doing 
(acceptable or not), but it also signaled to future courts that 
considering such values is not required. 
IV.  THE RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY 
When one right conflicts with another, a court must balance the 
rights to determine which one predominates.99 Although it only 
recognized one, the WRTL Court was in fact deciding between two 
rights: the right to free speech and the right to democracy.100 Without 
identifying both rights and determining the extent to which they 
conflicted (if at all), the Court overlooked the risk its decision posed 
to the right of American citizens to democratic governance. 
 
 96. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 112 (Yale University Press 2003) (London 1859) 
(“[E]very opinion which embodies somewhat of the portion of truth which the common opinion 
omits, ought to be considered precious . . . .”). 
 97. See POSNER, supra note 53, at 92 (describing the “perverse effects” of campaign finance 
laws and the “arbitrary advantage” they confer to candidates with affluent supporters). 
 98. Baker, supra note 80, at 966. 
 99. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 100. See supra Part I.B. 
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A. The Right to Democracy in American Law 
The notion that United States citizens are entitled to republican 
democracy is well worn in America’s history and its law. Two-and-a-
half years after the Boston Tea Party violently rejected taxation on 
tea imports under the slogan, “No taxation without representation,”101 
the Declaration of Independence declared that, as Professor Thomas 
M. Franck explains, “governments, instituted to secure the 
‘unalienable rights’ of their citizens, derive ‘their just powers from the 
consent of the governed.’”102 The Declaration of Independence 
reinforced this position by providing “a second proposition”: “that a 
nation earns ‘separate and equal station’ in the community of states 
by demonstrating ‘a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.’”103 
The Constitution formally establishes elected legislative and 
executive branches.104 It “guarantee[s] to every State . . . a Republican 
Form of Government.”105 
Since the Founding, the sense that the United States government 
is to be “of the people, by the people, for the people”106 has only 
solidified. One indicator of the entitlement to participatory 
government is the increasing inclusiveness of American democracy, 
as the series of constitutional amendments extending the right to vote 
demonstrates.107 Nearly half of the amendments passed after the Bill 
of Rights have somehow expanded democratic participation.108 
 
 101. See DANIEL A. SMITH, TAX CRUSADERS AND THE POLITICS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
21–23 (1998) (discussing the Boston Tea Party and other examples of popular resistance to taxes 
in America). 
 102. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 
46, 46 (1992); see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“That to 
secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed . . . .”). 
 103. Franck, supra note 102, at 46; see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 
(articulating the philosophical basis for the Declaration of Independence). 
 104. U.S. CONST. arts. I–II; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison), supra note 
5, at 351 (“Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the 
poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, 
more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the 
great body of the people of the United States.”). 
 105. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 106. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT 
GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 263 (1992). 
 107. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“[H]istory has seen a continuing 
expansion of the scope of the right of suffrage in this country.”). 
 108. U.S. CONST. amend. XII (allowing voters to cast independent votes for president and 
vice president); id. amend. XV (prohibiting proscriptions on the right to vote based on race, 
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Another indicator is the importance this overarching notion of 
democracy has been given in specific application, that is, how 
democracy’s constituent practices have been protected by the 
government. Perhaps the most direct proxy for the right to democracy 
is the franchise. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the 
right to vote is a fundamental right protected by the Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.109 As Chief Justice 
Earl Warren wrote, “The right to vote freely for the candidate of 
one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any 
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative 
government.”110 Because the right to vote is “preservative of all 
rights,” it is a “fundamental political right”111 that demands 
heightened protection under a strict scrutiny standard.112 The right to 
democratic participation is so important that “[a]ny unjustified 
discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs 
or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of 
representative government.”113 
 
color, or previous servitude); id. amend. XVII (mandating the direct election of senators); id. 
amend. XIX (establishing that neither states nor the federal government may deny the right to 
vote based on the voter’s sex); id. amend. XXIII (granting presidential electors to the District of 
Columbia); id. amend. XXIV (banning poll taxes in federal elections); id. amend. XXVI (setting 
the minimum voting age at eighteen); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 10.8.1, at 871–72 
(discussing some of these amendments). 
 109. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“[T]he right to vote as the legislature 
has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight 
accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.”); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. 
Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626–27 (1969) (“Statutes granting the franchise to residents on a 
selective basis always pose the danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the 
governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives. Therefore . . . the Court must 
determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.” 
(footnote omitted)); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (“We conclude 
that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it 
makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.”); Reynolds, 377 
U.S. at 555 (“The right to vote can neither be denied outright . . . nor diluted . . . .” (citations 
omitted)). 
 110. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555. 
 111. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 
17 (1964) (“No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election 
of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the 
most basic, are illusory, if the right to vote is undermined.”). 
 112. E.g., Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627 (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965)); see 
also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 (“[S]ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and 
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged 
infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”). 
 113. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626. 
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The Supreme Court has zealously protected the right to vote 
from many impediments. It has struck down poll taxes,114 residency 
duration minimums,115 exclusions from the franchise based on race,116 
and property ownership requirements.117 Since 1962, the Supreme 
Court has held that the population of electoral districts must be 
roughly equal and that plaintiffs seeking their rights under this rule 
may bring a justiciable claim.118 The Court has subsequently 
invalidated various attempts to malapportion or otherwise dilute the 
voting power of particular citizens or districts.119 The Court has also 
invalidated multimember voting districts in cases in which they 
tended to “minimize the voting strength of [economic, ethnic, 
political, or racial] minority groups.”120 In each case, the Court made 
the right to vote fundamental—and extended equal protection—
because of the critical link between voting and democratic health.121 
The Court has also treated another individual right based on the 
entitlement to democracy, the right of a candidate to appear on the 
ballot, as a right worthy of protection.122 Courts have protected access 
 
 114. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666; see also id. at 686 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Property and poll-
tax qualifications, very simply, are not in accord with current egalitarian notions of how a 
modern democracy should be organized.”). 
 115. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972). 
 116. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341–48 (1960) (invalidating a districting 
plan in Tuskegee, Alabama, that put almost all black residents outside the city limits); Nixon v. 
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540–41 (1927) (declaring unconstitutional a Texas statute that barred 
African Americans from voting in primaries). 
 117. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1970) (municipal bonds); 
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 702 (1969) (per curiam) (utility bond referenda); 
Kramer, 395 U.S. at 622 (property ownership requirements in school board elections). 
 118. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962). 
 119. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744 (1983) (declaring unconstitutional a 
districting scheme for the House of Representatives because of small variations in district size); 
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (“The conception of political equality from the 
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, 
and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”). 
 120. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616–17 (1982). But see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 
U.S. 55, 70 (1980) (“[A] disproportionate impact alone cannot be decisive, and courts must look 
to other evidence to support a finding of discriminatory purpose.”); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 
755, 765–66 (1973) (finding that two challenged multimember districts were unconstitutional 
because they discriminated against blacks and Mexican Americans). 
 121. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964) (“Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a 
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.”); Sanders, 372 U.S. at 380–81. 
 122. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32, 30–32 (1968) (“Competition in ideas and 
governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment 
freedoms. New parties struggling for their place must have the time and opportunity to organize 
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to the ballot against exorbitant filing fees123 and requirements that 
candidates own real property.124 Defending a candidate’s right to 
appear on the ballot, the Supreme Court provided yet another 
democracy-oriented rationale by pointing out that infringing on that 
right injures “the right of individuals to associate for the advancement 
of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters . . . to cast their 
votes effectively,” two of “our most precious freedoms.”125 
A third example is the status of political speech as the crux of the 
First Amendment right to speech. For the reasons Part III.A 
discussed, free speech exists in large part to promote healthy political 
discourse in a democracy. According to the Court, “speech 
concerning public affairs” is “more than self-expression; it is the 
essence of self-government.”126 The Supreme Court has therefore held 
that political speech is entitled to protection under the strict scrutiny 
standard largely because of its link to democracy.127 
These examples prompt a few observations. First, as the 
founding documents and the constitutional amendments expanding 
the electorate demonstrate, citizens are constitutionally entitled to 
participatory governance. Second, the Court so highly values this 
entitlement to democracy that it has found even lesser rights to be 
fundamental to protect democratic governance. Third, the Court has 
consistently struck down laws and practices that make the democratic 
process substantially more ineffective, inequitable, or inauthentic.128 
 
in order to meet reasonable requirements for ballot position, just as the old parties have had in 
the past.”). 
 123. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974) (invalidating filing fees imposed on 
indigent candidates); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (invalidating filing fees for 
primary ballots). 
 124. E.g., Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 106–07 (1989); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 
(1970). 
 125. Williams, 393 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added). 
 126. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 
214, 218 (1966) (“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”); Whitney v. California, 
274 U.S. 357, 376, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Recognizing the occasional 
tyrannies of governing majorities, [the Founders] amended the Constitution so that free speech 
and assembly should be guaranteed.”); supra Part III.A. 
 127. See supra note 91. 
 128. One might point out that antidemocratic elements are also central to the American 
theory of government. Although true, the Court has tended to limit those elements to what 
specific provisions explicitly mandate—but no further. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
568 (1964) (holding that, although the membership of the United States Senate is apportioned 
by state and not by population, states may only apportion representatives and districts by 
population). 
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B. The Second Role Democracy Should Have Played in WRTL 
American law establishes that democracy is an independent 
right, an entitlement that people may expect the government to 
protect. As a right itself, the democratic entitlement can conflict with 
other rights. Whether the right to democracy conflicted with First 
Amendment free speech protections in WRTL is an unresolved 
question—one the Court majority did not even ask. In undertaking to 
protect political speech without considering democracy, the Court 
resembled homeowners who erect a fence around their property 
without knowing where their property ends and their neighbor’s 
begins. 
One might wonder what harm occurs when a court fails to 
consider any rights other than free expression in political speech cases 
such as WRTL. The first answer is that, if a court fails properly to 
recognize a right that nonetheless exists, it risks unknowingly 
encroaching on the unrecognized right in ways that it might not be 
able to justify otherwise. Some commentators, for example, have 
argued that the Court’s decision in WRTL was a blow to the health of 
American democracy.129 These impacts aside, the WRTL majority’s 
decision has set the precedent that free speech may be considered in a 
vacuum; if future cases follow it, their decisions too could injure the 
democratic process. 
Applying the right of representative governance in questions of 
election reform would have other important implications. 
Recognizing the right to democratic governance would put it on more 
equal footing with the right to political speech. Political speech is 
normally entitled to strict scrutiny protection, which is usually enough 
to sound the death knell for whatever challenges it.130 But when free 
speech conflicts with another right, the presumption against whatever 
 
 129. See, e.g., Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Brennan Center Statement on Ruling 
in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (June 25, 2007), http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
content/resource/brennan_center_statement_on_ruling_in_fec_v_wisconsin_right_to_life/ (“The 
Supreme Court’s decision today re-opens the floodgates of unlimited special interest money in 
federal elections . . . . The Court is willfully ignoring how modern campaigns work. The 
exception created with this decision swallows the rule the Court found constitutional less than 
four years ago.”). But see Newt Gingrich, Blacking out Speech: McCain-Feingold’s Assault on 
Freedom, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES., June 1, 2006, http://www.aei.org/ 
publications/filter.all,pubID.24468/pub_detail.asp (arguing that the BCRA injured the “bond of 
trust between the American people and their elected representatives” and made “it harder for 
candidates of middle-class means to run for office at all”). 
 130. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (“[I]t is the rare case in which we have 
held that a law survives strict scrutiny.”); supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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conflicts with it is not so one-sided. For example, Burson v. Freeman131 
held that a Tennessee statute barring political signage and vote 
solicitation within one hundred feet of a polling location did “not 
constitute an unconstitutional compromise.”132 The Court concluded 
that when “the exercise of free speech rights conflicts with another 
fundamental right, the right to cast a ballot in an election free from 
the taint of intimidation and fraud,” the statute restraining free 
speech may survive strict scrutiny.133 Because the government 
“indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of 
its election process,”134 recognizing democracy as a right would 
prompt the Court to engineer a “compromise”;135 the Court would 
weigh the two competing considerations against each other without 
giving speech the benefit of the doubt.136 Recognizing democracy as a 
fundamental right would therefore level the playing field, weakening 
the presumption in favor of unbridled speech. 
No Justice of the Supreme Court has explicitly used the right to 
democracy as an enforceable right in the context of election reform. 
The pro-regulation opinions of the McConnell majority and the 
WRTL dissent have come close, however. In McConnell, the majority 
used a less stringent standard of review than strict scrutiny because of 
concerns regarding democracy: 
Our treatment of contribution restrictions reflects more than the 
limited burdens they impose on First Amendment freedoms. It also 
reflects the importance of the interests that underlie contribution 
limits—interests in preventing “both the actual corruption 
threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public 
confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of 
corruption.” . . . Because the electoral process is the very “means 
through which a free society democratically translates political 
 
 131. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
 132. Id. at 211. 
 133. Id. As the Court noted, 
[Because activity], even in a quintessential public forum, may interfere with other 
important activities for which the property is used. . . . the government may regulate 
the time, place, and manner of the expressive activity, so long as such restrictions are 
content neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, 
and leave open ample alternatives for communication. 
Id. at 197. 
 134. Id. at 199 (quoting Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 
(1989)). 
 135. Id. at 211. 
 136. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2669 (2007) (“Where the First 
Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor.”). 
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speech into concrete governmental action,” contribution limits, like 
other measures aimed at protecting the integrity of the process, 
tangibly benefit public participation in political debate. For that 
reason, when reviewing Congress’ decision to enact contribution 
limits, “there is no place for a strong presumption against 
constitutionality, of the sort often thought to accompany the words 
‘strict scrutiny.’”137 
This reasoning suggests recognition that democracy is anomalous 
among interests. The Court could just as easily have said that the 
integrity of the democratic process is a compelling interest that meets 
the strict scrutiny standard. Its refusal to afford strict scrutiny 
protection in this case—and to require the government to meet the 
compelling government interest standard that accompanies strict 
scrutiny protections—marks democracy as fundamentally different 
from the typical interests that might arise in such a case. The Court 
treats democracy as a right to be balanced against another right, 
rather than an interest that must meet its heavy burden. 
In the WRTL dissent, Justice Souter cites the “compelling 
interest” standard only once and only when recounting McConnell’s 
understanding of the importance of limiting electioneering 
communications.138 Yet he made extended appeals to an idea he called 
“democratic integrity,”139 a concept whose roots may stretch back at 
least to the Court’s 1989 opinion in Eu v. San Francisco County 
Democratic Central Committee,140 which discussed the importance of 
“preserving the integrity of [the] election process.”141 Justice Souter 
claimed that keeping undue power out of the hands of “deep 
pockets,”142 making political expenditures better represent “political 
 
 137. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136–37 (2003) (citations omitted) (quoting Nixon v. 
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring); FEC v. Nat’l 
Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982)). McConnell was referring to Buckley’s use of 
“closely drawn” scrutiny for campaign contributions. The McConnell majority recognized that 
setting a less stringent standard of review has been a lightning rod for attacks from the more 
conservative Justices. See id. at 137 (“Our application of this less rigorous degree of scrutiny has 
given rise to significant criticism in the past from our dissenting colleagues.”). 
 138. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2696 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[In McConnell, we] 
understood that Congress had a compelling interest in limiting this sort of electioneering by 
corporations and unions . . . .”). 
 139. Id. at 2687. 
 140. Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989). 
 141. Id. at 231; see also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (discussing the 
protection of “the integrity and reliability” of the electoral process). 
 142. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2688 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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preference” rather than the interests of “high-dollar pragmatists” that 
buy influence,143 and mitigating “pervasive public cynicism”144 are all 
“elements summed up in the notion of political integrity, giving it a 
value second to none in a free society.”145 He then spent several pages 
delineating the historical evolution and ideological roots of the 
democratic integrity concept, claiming also that it has been “obvious” 
since roughly the end of the Civil War “that the purchase of influence 
and the cynicism of voters threaten the integrity and stability of 
democratic government, each derived from the responsiveness of its 
law to the interests of citizens and their confidence in that focus.”146 
Thus, the WRTL dissent emphasized protecting political 
integrity and not the question of showing a compelling interest 
narrowly tailored to achieving that object. This departure from the 
traditional threshold question, although not an embrace of the rights-
oriented analysis this Note suggests, moves in that direction. 
Using the right to democratic governance to counterbalance the 
freedom of speech would hopefully counteract the tendency of 
regulation opponents to dismiss the harms to democratic governance 
that a failure to regulate could cause. Courts should not consider 
impacts on democracy only when doing so is convenient or supports 
their arguments. Acknowledging democracy as a right would hold 
judges accountable to addressing it. If democracy is more than a 
backdrop for individual rights, courts cannot ignore or circumvent its 
implications for lack of precedent. Consequently, recognizing the 
right to democracy would clarify the debate over campaign reform 
because both pro- and anti-regulation advocates would be able to 
identify the core issue—whether free speech conflicts with democracy 
and, if so, whether it trumps democratic considerations. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s failure to recognize 
democracy as a right has uncomfortable implications for the United 
States’ international relations. When the United States government 
advocates for something abroad that it is unwilling to implement 
domestically, it may be seen as hypocritical by foreign nations.147 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 2689 (emphasis added). Justice Souter also remarked that Congress has 
recognized democratic integrity and acted against threats to it. Id. at 2687. 
 146. Id. at 2689. 
 147. For example, before the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483 (1954), and before the civil rights movement had run its course, observers often 
remarked that segregation and racial discrimination in the United States were “a source of 
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While the Supreme Court was handing down its WRTL decision, the 
federal government was working to maintain a fledgling electoral 
system in Iraq that imposed by law a “media silence period” directly 
during elections.148 This regulation went far beyond the proscriptions 
of the BCRA; it barred the media from reporting on partisan 
activities for a certain length of time before Iraqi elections.149 Thus, 
the law would have been unconstitutional by WRTL standards. The 
United States’ efforts to set up such electoral systems abroad, 
combined with its emphatic participation in treaties that entitle 
individuals to democratic governance,150 causes the Court’s language 
in WRTL to ring hollow. Recognizing the right to democracy at home 
would not hurt United States foreign policy efforts to spread 
democracy abroad.151 
 
constant embarrassment to [the United States] Government in the day-to-day conduct of its 
foreign relations; and it jeopardize[d] the effective maintenance of [its] moral leadership of the 
free and democratic nations of the world.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme 
Court, Address at the Centre for Human Rights of the University of Pretoria (Feb. 7, 2006), 
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_02-07a-06.html (quoting 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 8, 101, 191, 
413, 448), 1952 WL 82045). As Chief Justice Earl Warren explained eighteen years after Brown, 
the change in United States race relations policies 
was fostered primarily by the presence of [World War II] itself. . . . While proclaiming 
themselves inexorably opposed to Hitler’s practices, many Americans were tolerating 
the segregation and humiliation of nonwhites within their own borders. The 
contradiction between the egalitarian rhetoric employed against the Nazis and the 
presence of racial segregation in America was a painful one. 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting retired Chief Justice Earl Warren). Thus, “there is little 
doubt” that the Brown decision “both reflected and propelled the development of human rights 
protection internationally.” Id. 
 148. See Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq Regulation 11/2004, § 2.3 (2004), 
available at http://uniraq.org/elections/regulations.asp (“There shall be a media silence period 
between the end of the campaign period and the closing of the polling stations at the end of 
polling, during which there shall be no media coverage of any Iraqi partisan political activity.”). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 55/96, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/55/96 (Feb. 28, 2001) 
(calling on states to promote democracy by establishing certain rights); G.A. Res. 46/137, U.N. 
GAOR 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/137 (Dec. 17, 1991) (calling on states to enhance the 
effectiveness of periodic and genuine elections by affirming and respecting their citizens’ right 
to political participation); Charter of the Organization of American States art. III, Apr. 30, 1948, 
2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 (creating a duty for states to work toward “the effective exercise 
of representative democracy”). 
 151. The United States has sometimes used whether another government is democratically 
governed as a criterion for recognizing a state. See, e.g., LORI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 258 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing U.S. Secretary of 
State James Baker’s policy, which included support for democracy as a criterion for recognition 
of statehood). 
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CONCLUSION 
Democracy is more than background scenery. It is both an 
underlying justification for free speech rights and an independent 
entitlement of citizens distinct from other rights. Regulations and 
private action can strengthen or threaten it. The Supreme Court’s 
decision in WRTL overlooks this important value, not because it 
found that the government’s regulations burdened political speech or 
because it determined that free speech and democracy could coexist, 
but because it held that the empirical implications of political speech 
and government regulation had no bearing.  
This decision was problematic for two reasons. First, democracy 
is one of the primary reasons political speech rights exist. The right to 
political speech therefore extends only insofar as this root purpose 
demands. But when a court forgets the interests underlying a right 
and seeks to enforce a right in absolute form—as the Court did in 
WRTL—it risks extending the protections of that right to a point so 
unjustified that the right’s exercise becomes antithetical to its 
purpose. Second, democracy is an independent entitlement. The 
Constitution, the American tradition, and American law all implicitly 
recognize this democratic entitlement. To ignore this right as the 
WRTL majority did is to deny its validity and its value, signaling that 
democracy is of no consequence in free speech jurisprudence. 
Hopefully future judges will genuinely consider how money in 
politics strengthens or hinders democracy, because upholding other 
rights and interests without considering their impacts on democracy 
ignores a critical element in the American system of rights. 
Democracy has played a central role in American history and legal 
theory. For any judicial decision to remain true to democracy’s 
importance, it is up to the judge to treat it as more than a mere paper 
commitment. 
